LBT 371-374 威鈴

Let us focus on the species-specificities of behavior. There are certain cerebral functions that mediate between sensory input and motor output which we shall call generically cognitive function. The neurophysiology of cognitive function is largely unknown but its behavioral correlates are the propensity for problem solving, the formation of learning sets, the tendency to generalize in certain directions, or the facility for memorizing some but not other conditions. The interaction or integrated patterns of all of these different potentialities produces the cognitive specificities that have induced von Uexkuell, the forerunner of modern ethology, to propose that every species has its own world-view. The phenomenological implications of his formulation may sound old-fashioned today, but students of animal behavior cannot ignore the fact that the differences in cognitive processes (1)are empirically demonstrable and (2) are the correlates of species-specific behavior.

讓我們把焦點放在特定物種的行為上。在知覺的輸入與我們一般認為的認知功能之間還有某種的腦部功能做為中介。認知功能方面的神經生理學目前還不為人所知，但行為上的研究依然與問題解決、學習的形成、一些方向的歸納傾向或是為了記憶而有設備有關。這些不同的互動與綜合的型式的潛能會產生出認知獨特性。Von-Uexkuell—現代人類學的先驅。他假設每種物種都有它獨特的世界觀。他所推測的這些現在可能落伍了，但研究動物行為的學生仍不能忽略認知過程不同的這個事實。

(ii) Specific properties of cognitive function are replicated in every member of the species.
Although there are individual differences among all creatures, the members of one species resemble each other very closely. In every individual a highly invariable type of both form and function is replicated. Individual differences of most characteristics tend to have a normal (Gaussian) frequency distribution and the differences within species are smaller than between species. (We are disregarding special taxonomic problems in species identification.) The application of these notions to (i) makes it clear that also the cognitive processes and potentialities that are characteristics of a species are replicated in every individual. Notice that we must distinguish between what an individual actually does and what he is capable of doing. The intraspecific similarity holds for the latter, not the former, and the similarity in capacity becomes striking only if we concentrate on the general type and manner of activity and disregard such variables as how fast or how accurately a given performance is carried out.
(ii) 認知功能的特定特性會反映在每個物種中。
雖然生物之間有個別的差異，但同一物種之下的成員彼此之間還是十分相似。
每一個物種都有複製了不變的型態與功能。大部分個體的差異傾向於正常頻率分布和物種自己的差異小於物種之間的差異。(我們不考慮在物種定義中的分類的特殊問題。) 這些觀念運用在
(i)讓物種的認知過程與潛力更加清楚，這也是每種個體都有的物種的特徵。注意我們必須分辨個體確實做了甚麼與個體有能力去做甚麼。至於intraspecific的相似性我們之後再探討。只有我們專注於活動一般的種類與方式和不顧這些表現執行的多快與多正確的變數，這些相似性才會變得驚人。
(iii) Cognitive processes and capacities are differentiated spontaneously with maturation.
This statement must not be confused with the question of how much the environment contributes to development. It is obvious that all development requires an appropriate substrate and availability of certain forms of energy. However, in most cases environments are not specific to just one form of life and development. A forest pond may be an appropriate environment for hundreds of different forms of life. It may support the fertilized egg of a frog or a minnow, and each of the eggs will respond to just those types and forms of energy that are appropriate to it. The frog’s egg will develop into a frog and the minnow’s egg into a minnow. The pond just makes the building stones available, but the organismic architecture unfolds through conditions that are created within the maturing individual.

(iii) 認知過程與潛力不同於自然的成熟。
這個陳述與環境如何發展有關的問題並不會令人困惑。很明顯的所有的發展都需要適當的底層與力量的一種形式。 然而，大部分的例子中環境並不是指生活的形式和發展。森林中的池塘可能很適合數以百計不同生命形態所生活的環境。池塘會養育青蛙的受精蛋或是小魚，但每一種蛋都是適合這個環境的力量型式的一種。青蛙蛋會生出青蛙與小魚的蛋會生出小魚。池塘指示一個建造出的石頭但這有機的建築展現出可以創造出成熟個體的環境與條件。